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Trends in Communist Propaganda

20 Feb 75

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
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TRENDS

In Communist Propaganda

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MIDDLE EAST

BREZHNEV IMPLIES CRITICISM OF KISSINGER "BILATERAL" APPROACH

Moscow's comment on Secretary Kissinger's 10-11 February round of talks in the Middle East has provided a somewhat mixed assessment of the U.S. negotiating efforts. The bulk of the comment has sought to cast doubt on the success of Kissinger's mission and, as in the past, has been critical of U.S. attempts to mediate new Israeli-Arab agreements. Brezhnev, making his first public appearances since December, was sharply critical of "partial bilateral measures" in his 14 February speech at a luncheon for visiting British Prime Minister Wilson. He assailed "certain persons" for offering the Arabs a soporific in the hope they would forget about restoration of justice. Soviet media of course did not acknowledge an exchange between Gromyko and Kissinger over Brezhnev's remark about "certain persons" when they met with newsmen following their 16-17 February talks in Geneva. Moscow gave the Gromyko-Kissinger meetings routine publicity, in the same fashion as the treatment of their meetings last spring in Geneva, Nicosia and Damascus. The communique on their talks did not go beyond points in the November Vladivostok summit communique.

BREZHNEV SPEECH Brezhnev's remarks on the Mideast in his 14 February luncheon speech were his most pointed criticisms yet of the U.S. negotiating approach. He did, however, concede that "partial measures" were in themselves useful, but only as steps toward rapid conclusion of a "real" peaceful settlement and only if they were not used as a pretext for freezing the situation, delaying a settlement and weakening Arab unity.* This is reminiscent of his remarks on the initial Egyptian-Israeli disengagement agreement, made in a Havana speech in January 1974, when he described the accord as a positive step but went on to assert that the Geneva conference must achieve a political settlement and to urge full implementation of UN decisions. And in a speech last October in Kishinev, Brezhnev referred to the disengagement agreements as "useful as an initial measure," while reiterating that they did not replace a complete settlement.

* The reference to bilateral agreements as "useful" is unusual but has appeared before in recent Soviet Mideast comment. A 10 October 1974 IZVESTIYA article by senior political observer A. Bovin, pegged to Dr. Kissinger's 9-15 October Mideast trip, said that "half-measures," such as the disengagement agreements, could "play a role" in politics or could "freeze" a situation. He added that they could also "serve as a useful means for shifting the situation from a standstill and facilitating radical advances."

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Brezhnev in his current speech assailed the partial bilateral measures already achieved, arguing that they had not reduced tension or curbed the "burdensome and dangerous arms race" in the region and could not take the place of a genuine peace settlement. Declaring that delay of such a settlement was "impermissible," Brezhnev again advocated "speediest" resumption of the Geneva conference.

Limited followup comment on Brezhnev's speech has tailored the emphasis to the audience. A commentary by Moscow radio's Arabic service on the 18th, for instance, made no mention of Brezhnev's remark that partial measures can be "useful" and instead characterized the speech in routine terms as having exposed maneuvers by "Tel Aviv, supported by certain circles in the West," to avoid a peace settlement and to limit the issue to "so-called partial agreements or Israeli troop withdrawals from part of occupied Arab territories." TASS general director Leonid Zamyatin, on the other hand, during Moscow radio's observers' roundtable on the 16th, reiterated the point that "if these partial interim measures are aimed at solving the key questions, then they are useful; but if they are aimed at lulling vigilance, especially of the Arab people, then they are harmful." Zamyatin also stressed that Brezhnev's speech had clearly stated that "partial measures" cannot succeed in creating a "stable Mideast peace."

GISSINGER TRIP In line with Moscow's handling of Secretary Kissinger's previous Mideast trips, Soviet media evaluations of his recent mission have played down its potential importance, frequently using the device of citing foreign media comment to express doubts about its prospects for success. TASS English on the 15th, for example, reporting Kissinger's arrival in Bonn, cited an unnamed New York TIMES correspondent as saying that although the Secretary's public statements on the Middle East were optimistic, "in private he sounded dubious about the success of his mission." IZVESTIYA on the 18th claimed that the foreign press as a whole was "restrained" in its comment on Kissinger's trip, "noting the Israeli leaders' rigid position and their obvious desire to obtain certain concessions from the Arab countries in exchange for gradual withdrawal of their forces." Earlier, IZVESTIYA had referred on the 14th to unspecified "political observers" who thought that the Secretary's 10-12 February talks in Tel Aviv had been "highly difficult," since Israel was reluctant to offer the Arabs concessions. IZVESTIYA also cited Egyptian Foreign Minister Fahmy as saying, just before Kissinger's arrival on the 12th in Cairo, that Egypt would "under no circumstances sign a separate peace agreement with Israel."

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Some Soviet comment has indirectly acknowledged the possibility of new bilateral agreements in the near future, at the same time downplaying a U.S. role. In one such example, a statement by Fahmi in the Beirut AL-HAYAH on the 16th was selectively reported in an account carried by TASS and broadcast by Moscow in Arabic the same day, and also published in IZVESTIYA on the 18th. The account cited Fahmi as asserting that the results of Secretary Kissinger's Mideast talks showed that the region was "still far from peace." The Soviet account passed over in silence Fahmi's contention that Kissinger's recent visit to Egypt "called for optimism." However, in an unusually explicit reference to the course of future diplomatic events in the Middle East, the account reported Fahmi's expectation that "before June new agreements will be signed on the disengagement of troops in Sinai and on the Golan Heights" on terms "acceptable to both Egypt and Syria," and that "immediately after" these new agreements, the Geneva conference would be reconvened.

SOVIET-EGYPTIAN RELATIONS

TASS also selectively reported on the 19th a speech made by Fahmi the previous day before a People's Assembly committee, singling out statements portraying the positive side of Soviet-Egyptian relations while ignoring his references to problems, and quoting him on the Geneva talks while avoiding his remarks on new Egyptian-Israeli agreements. Thus TASS cited Fahmi's statement that Egypt wants the Soviet Union "to play an effective role in settling the Middle East problem" because it has "special responsibility" for international security and is "a friend of whom we are proud." The account ignored Fahmi's interpretation of Brezhnev's 14 February speech that "the Soviet Union does not oppose any move to achieve further withdrawal from Arab territories provided that the aim behind this move is not to attempt to bring about a stalemate or move away from the Geneva conference." While citing him to the effect that a final settlement must occur within the Geneva conference framework, TASS omitted his defense of Egypt's rationale for entertaining new bilateral agreements with Israel as a "prelude" to a renewed Geneva conference.

On bilateral relations, TASS stressed Fahmi's reference to numerous Cairo-Moscow contacts resulting in progress in bilateral relations "based on full frankness and respect," with "no difference on international problems." TASS also included Fahmi's remark that Egypt does not regard the Soviet Union as only a source of weapons, but that the countries cooperate in many areas. The TASS account, unsurprisingly, made no mention of Fahmi's mention of the "two outstanding problems" harming Soviet-Egyptian relations: Soviet replacement of arms and equipment lost by Egypt during the October 1973 war, and revision of Cairo's debt payment schedules.

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PEKING SEES "NEW ROUND" OF U.S.-SOVIET RIVALRY IN MIDEAST

Secretary Kissinger's and Foreign Minister Gromyko's recent visits to the Middle East and their 16-17 February Geneva meeting prompted an NCNA commentary on the 17th which typically focused on the superpowers' intensified rivalry in the area. The commentary presented the two sides' current peace efforts as merely a continuation of their competition for political influence in the Middle East, asserting that the two envoys had put on "rival shows" designed to undercut each other's settlement efforts. The U.S. formula for a step-by-step solution under U.S. auspices was portrayed as being the dominant position now, with NCNA pointing to Brezhnev's postponed Middle East visit as proof that "Soviet hegemonism in the Middle East has run against a stone wall." Peking indicated that sharp Soviet propaganda attacks against Kissinger's "private diplomacy"--including Brezhnev's 14 February outburst against unnamed advocates of a "step-by-step solution"--were an indication of Soviet sensitivity to being put on the defensive by the U.S. envoy.

Peking also saw a decline in Moscow's influence with key Arab states, especially Egypt, and noted Gromyko's efforts to bridge the "rift" in Egyptian-Soviet relations, which it said had become more obvious after Brezhnev's visit was postponed. The article reviewed Cairo's grounds for dissatisfaction with Moscow, including recent Egyptian charges of Soviet unwillingness to replace arms lost in the October 1973 war and alleged Soviet pressure for prompt repayment of Egyptian debts to the USSR. Kissinger was depicted as adroitly taking advantage of the Soviet decline by extending U.S. aid offers to Egypt and Syria. Against this backdrop of mutual contention, NCNA briefly characterized the Kissinger-Gromyko talks in Geneva as a meeting of two irreconcilable adversaries who each wanted to find out their opponent's "real designs."

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CYPRUS

MOSCOW SCORES TURKISH CYPRIOT STATE DECREE, ASKS UN TALKS

Moscow's most authoritative comment thus far on the Turkish Cypriots' 13 February proclamation of a "federated Turkish Cypriot state" came in a 16 February TASS statement which termed the action a "new aggravation" of the situation, reaffirmed Soviet support for the "legitimate" government of Cyprus, and reiterated the Soviet proposal of last August for an international conference on Cyprus under UN auspices. The TASS statement also was more straightforward in its criticism of Turkey and the Turkish Cypriots, in contrast with Moscow's restrained, implicit criticism since the July 1974 Turkish invasion.

The TASS statement, released only a few hours before Gromyko met with Secretary Kissinger in Geneva, noted that "it is believed in Soviet leading circles" that the current Cyprus situation calls for immediate and full implementation of UN decisions on Cyprus. The situation, it said, confirmed the need to implement the Soviet proposal--advanced in a Soviet Government statement on 22 August 1974--for examination of the Cyprus problem at a representative conference within the UN framework. The statement declared that all states had a duty to facilitate UN efforts and strive to preserve Cyprus as an "independent, sovereign and territorially integral state." The statement and other Moscow comment have stressed Soviet constancy on the issue. TASS director general Zamyatin on the 14th, for example, had pointed out that the Soviet position was well-known and that "it is now unchanged too."

In contrast to earlier formal Soviet statements which had criticized the Turkish and Turkish Cypriot roles only implicitly, the TASS statement was more direct. However, it avoided giving details of the Turkish Cypriot action in declaring that the "leadership of the Turkish community"--not the Turkish Cypriot community--had taken "unilateral steps to set up a separate state structure on the part of the island's territory occupied by Turkish troops." These steps, TASS said, were "aimed at perpetuation of the situation which resulted from outside armed interference in the affairs of the Cyprus Republic." While TASS did refer to Turkish troop occupation, it made no other direct mention of Turkey. But the statement again resorted to standard charges against "certain NATO circles"--a euphemism, in particular contexts, for Ankara. Thus the statement complained that these circles were attempting to frustrate the

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process of settlement and "effect a division of the island." The statement also inveighed against attempts to solve the Cyprus problem "in the narrow circle of NATO member countries by means of military force and political diktat." Soviet charges of NATO involvement also occur in a broader alliance framework. Thus a Mandarin-language commentary on the 17th, for example, maintained that "NATO strategists" have instigated both sides--the "extremists" and the "insurgents"--in order to obstruct a settlement between the two communities. Moscow media have also widely replayed a charge by the Cypriot communist party, AKEL, on the 15th that NATO's objective was to convert Cyprus into a nuclear missile base.

Prior to the TASS statement, a Moscow broadcast in Turkish to Turkey on the 14th pointedly conveyed "concern in the Soviet Union" over the Turkish Cypriot decision on the announcement of "formation of a Turkish Cypriot federated state." The broadcast noted that the Turkish Cypriots' final aim was to unite with the Greek Cypriot community within the framework of a biregional federation. But it went on to point out that the "Turkish side in Cyprus" adopted its plan two days after the Cyprus Government had announced a plan under which Cyprus would remain an independent and sovereign state with a central government. This plan, the broadcast added, envisaged that formation of eight Turkish Cypriot cantons in various parts of the island, return of refugees to their homes, and freedom of movement throughout the republic. Suggesting that the USSR leaned toward the latter plan, the broadcast concluded with a reminder that the Soviet Union "repeatedly" had stated its support for the "sovereignty and national independence" of Cyprus. Support for "territorial integrity," usually reaffirmed in this formulation, was absent.

TASS on the 16th linked Ankara to the proclamation in reporting Turkish Prime Minister Irmak's statement that he supported the Turkish Cypriot action. Moscow radio comment in recent weeks had already become more explicit in its criticism as the Turkish element took other measures to consolidate the partition of the island, particularly the transfer of Turkish Cypriot refugees from the British bases in the south to the occupied area via Turkey.

"LEGAL" GOVERNMENT,
INTERCOMMUNAL TALKS

While the TASS statement reiterated Soviet support for the "legally elected" Government of Cyprus, it made no direct reference to President Makarios. But Leonid Zamyatin, briefing the press on the Soviet-British talks in Moscow, was reported by TASS on the 14th as declaring that the Soviet Government recognized "only one legitimate

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government of Cyprus, the government of President Makarios." Similar affirmations of recognition of Makarios' government appeared in the 17 February joint Soviet-British statement on Prime Minister Wilson's talks in Moscow, as well as in PRAVDA on the 16th and again in Moscow radio's observers' roundtable on the 17th. The 17 February communique on the Gromyko-Kissinger talks in Geneva said both sides confirmed their support for Cyprus' independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity and recognized "the present Cyprus Government" as the lawful government.

TASS on the 17th reported that Makarios had expressed the "gratitude of the government and people of Cyprus for the Soviet Union's support." Moscow has continued to avoid reporting statements carried by Nicosia and Athens media urging Makarios to seek Soviet aid and to meet with Soviet leaders, and typically also made no mention of Soviet Ambassador Astavan's hour-long meeting with Makarios on the 17th.

Reporting Makarios' reaction to the Turkish Cypriot decision, a Moscow domestic service broadcast on the 14th cited him as saying that the Cyprus Government had asked for an immediate meeting of the Security Council. Moscow subsequently has virtually ignored the topic of a Council meeting on the situation. The Moscow broadcast also reported Makarios as commenting on the "impossibility" of holding the intercommunal talks under the new conditions. The TASS statement noted that the action of the "Turkish community" came at a time when the intercommunal negotiations were aiming at reaching a "mutually acceptable, just solution of questions pertaining to the inner set-up" of the Cyprus state. While Moscow has supported the talks, it has not pressed in current comment for their continuation. TASS on the 14th, in a dispatch from Washington, reported that the State Department had "expressed regret" over the Turkish Cypriot statement on creation of a "federal Turkish state" and had called on both sides to return to the negotiating table.

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U. S. - SOVIET RELATIONS

BREZHNEV, PODGORNYY HAIL PROGRESS IN DETENTE, DEMAND "EQUALITY"

Continued Soviet support for detente, with the proviso that detente must be based on equality, was registered by Brezhnev in his 14 February speech honoring UK Prime Minister Wilson and by Podgornyy in an article, keyed to the World War II victory anniversary, in IZVESTIYA on the 13th. While both leaders refrained from any direct reference to Moscow's current bete noire--the U.S. trade bill--Podgornyy implicitly chided the United States in notably strong terms regarding the offending trade legislation. Neither leader referred to Brezhnev's scheduled trip to the United States this year, although Soviet media have recently reported President Ford's allusions to the prospective visit. Brezhnev's trip was hinted at only in veiled terms in a statement in the 17 February Gromyko-Kissinger communique to the effect that both sides intend to work out "in the current year" a strategic arms agreement based on the Vladivostok talks.

BREZHNEV In his first reported speech since he addressed the CPSU plenum on 16 December, Brezhnev in his 14 February luncheon speech portrayed the struggle in the world today as one between the proponents of detente and those bent on reviving the cold war, with the preponderance clearly on the side of the former. In keeping with the worldwide aspirations for peace and against war, he continued, "positive changes" have taken place in recent years in relations between the USSR and its allies, on the one hand, and such countries as France, West Germany, and the United States, as well as Britain. He declared that Soviet leaders were "fully determined to do all in their power to impart a historically irreversible character not only to international detente as such, but also to a real turn towards the long-term, fruitful and mutually beneficial cooperation of states with different social systems on the basis of full equality and mutual respect."

Brezhnev did not follow up his general censure of cold warriors bent on "interference in the affairs of other countries" with any implicit criticism aimed at the United States on the trade bill. In a subsequent portion of his speech he predictably praised the "good experience" in Soviet-British economic relations which, he stressed, had been developing for many years on the basis of "equality and considerable mutual advantage." He drew a direct

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connection between increased Soviet-British trade and Britain's economic prosperity, predicting that an expansion of such trade would result in new jobs for thousands of British workers and provide a new impetus to that country's economic development.

PODGORNY In terms unmistakably directed at the current U.S.-Soviet trade impasse and Senator Jackson, Podgornyy in his 13 February IZVESTIYA article roundly denounced "an abundance of politicians in the West" who are motivated by anti-Sovietism and bent on introducing "huckstering" into international relations. Such politicians, he charged in the article--reprinted from the February issue of SOVETSKIY SOYUZ--contend that "the Soviet Union ought to 'pay'" for relaxation and "make concessions in its policy, including concessions in affairs relating to the exclusive competence of any sovereign state." Podgornyy added that it was time for those who conceive of detente as "a political game" to realize that relations with the Soviet Union can only be based on full equality and noninterference in each other's internal affairs. He recalled in this connection that even when the young Soviet state had been under political boycott and economic blockade, it had not abandoned "a single one" of its principles.

In similarly tough terms, Podgornyy prefaced these remarks by stressing that progress in detente thus far was due to the fact that Western leaders had been "forced" to adopt realistic policies, exemplified in their summit meetings with Brezhnev and other Soviet leaders, meetings which had confirmed the practicability of peaceful coexistence and businesslike cooperation. Such progress, he added, was "unfortunately" accompanied by astronomically high military budgets and the continued stockpiling of nuclear weapons. Podgornyy's favorable allusion to the Vladivostok meeting--not mentioned by Brezhnev--was accompanied by a warning that such positive developments do not "erase class differences." Moscow's foreign policy, he declared, would continue to be aimed at halting imperialist aggression.

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SOVIET ARTICLE CAUTIONS WASHINGTON ON CLOSER TIES WITH PRC

A lengthy Soviet article by B.N. Zagegin in USA: ECONOMICS, POLITICS, IDEOLOGY--signed to the press on 9 January but only recently available in translation--has cautioned the United States against attempting to exploit its new relationship with China to gain leverage against the USSR. The article is Moscow's first comprehensive assessment of Sino-U.S. relations since Kissinger's China visit last November when it was announced that President Ford would visit Peking in 1975.

Soviet media had previously acknowledged the projected Ford trip only in passing. But the Zagegin article pointed up the possible impact the visit and improved U.S.-PRC ties would have on the triangular relationship among the three powers, advised that Washington's policy in effect strengthens Peking's anti-Sovietism, and pointedly questioned the U.S. Administration's motives in moving closer to Peking. These are similar to themes that were stressed in the outpouring of authoritative Moscow comment immediately after the July 1971 announcement that the then President Nixon would visit China. Subsequently, however, Moscow's reaction to improved Sino-U.S. relations has been more sanguine. For example, its response to the February 1973 Sino-U.S. agreement on establishment of liaison offices in each other's capitals--an article by TASS director L. Zamyatin in the 27 February 1973 SOVIET RUSSIA--took pains to point up assurances by President Nixon and Kissinger that the U.S. rapprochement with Peking was not directed against any third party.

Zagegin's current assessment ignored all such U.S. assurances and instead claimed that the U.S. Administration is in fact engaged in "gamesmanship" and endeavoring to improve its international leverage by moving closer to China. He showed particular uneasiness over what he called a "hint" of a desire by the United States and China to create a "condominium in Pacific Asia" that would exclude the USSR. He cited as evidence the mutual pledge in the 1972 Sino-U.S. Shanghai communique to prevent outside dominance in the Asia-Pacific region, U.S. official silence after China's armed assertion of its claim to islands in the South China Sea in 1974, and Peking's tacit support for U.S. plans to establish an Indian Ocean military base on Diego Garcia to counter Soviet influence.

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Zagegin further accused Peking and certain "influential Washington circles"--notably Senator Jackson and alleged proponents of the "military-industrial complex"--of exploiting mutual reconciliation to strengthen the Chinese and U.S. positions against Moscow. He stated that Peking was transparently trying to use its ties with the United States to gain great power status and U.S. military and political support against the USSR, and he charged that those U.S. circles attracted by China's anti-Soviet stance have advocated strengthened Sino-U.S. relations--even U.S. aid to China's military development--to improve the U.S. position vis-a-vis the Soviet Union. Zagegin accused the Ford Administration of pursuing such a policy, stating that Kissinger seeks "to improve U.S. maneuverability in the international arena" and to engage in "triangular diplomacy" by fostering the Chinese positions against the USSR. He alleged that "the initiators of the U.S.-Chinese rapprochement" "secretly counted on directing the chauvinist potencies of Maoism exclusively against the Soviet Union."

The article saw such a policy as being full of danger for the United States, since Peking would soon direct its growing power against U.S. as well as Soviet interests. In this connection, Zagegin played up an allegedly growing threat to U.S. interests in East Asia posed by Peking's enhanced nuclear missile and naval power. He also endeavored to show tensions in the current U.S.-PRC relationship by highlighting U.S. press reports of alleged Chinese dissatisfaction with the U.S. Administration's position on Taiwan and by claiming that the Chinese prefer the more strident anti-Soviet advocates such as Senator Jackson to the present Administration.

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INDOCHINA

SIHANOUK AND IENG SARY VISIT HANOI OVER TET HOLIDAY

Cambodian Prince Sihanouk's annual visit to Hanoi for the lunar new year Tet holiday closely followed the pattern set during his visit last year. DRV Premier Pham Van Dong once again led Vietnamese officials at the airport welcome and departure ceremonies and hosted an 11 February reception for the prince, and First Secretary Le Duan met with the Cambodian leader. In keeping with the pattern last year, the visit did not prompt Hanoi editorial comment or a joint communique--treatment which had marked Sihanouk visits for Tet from 1971 through 1973.

Sihanouk's 9-15 February stay in Hanoi coincided with a "friendship visit" to the DRV by Ieng Sary, the special adviser of RGNU Deputy Prime Minister Khieu Samphan. Ieng Sary had served in Peking as the "special envoy" of the communist insurgents from 1971 until 1973 when he returned to Cambodia. He had accompanied Sihanouk to Hanoi for Tet in 1972 and 1973. According to VNA, Ieng Sary's current visit was at the invitation of DRV Foreign Minister Trinh. He arrived on 10 February, met with Sihanouk on the following day, saw Pham Van Dong on the 13th, and was present at the airport for Sihanouk's departure on the 15th.

Speaking at the 11 February reception for Sihanouk, Pham Van Dong expressed particular satisfaction over advances in Cambodian-Vietnamese relations. He maintained that "a new, very fine step has been made in the past year in developing the militant solidarity and fraternal friendship between Vietnam and Cambodia," and he characterized the improvement in relations as "an extremely important factor" in strengthening both sides in their struggle for complete victory. The premier did not specify how relations had improved, but the past year has seen visits by RGNU Deputy Prime Minister Khieu Samphan to Hanoi in March and April 1974, the exchange of visits by RGNU/NUFC and PRG/NFLSV delegations to each other's "liberated zones," in June and December respectively, and the simultaneous formation last month of Vietnamese-Cambodian friendship associations in Hanoi and Cambodia.*

* The Cambodia-Vietnamese exchanges over the past year are discussed in the TRENDS of 3 April 1974, pages 9-11; 3 July 1974, pages 10, and 15 January 1975, pages 15-16.

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Pham Van Dong reaffirmed Sihanouk's position as "representative of the legality, legitimacy, and continuity of the Cambodian state," pledged renewed support for the Front's five-point settlement position, and echoed recent Cambodian complaints about expanded U.S. assistance to Phnom Penh. The premier reiterated the standard call that the United States must end its involvement to allow the Cambodians to settle their own affairs and pledged continued Indochinese unity against the common enemy.

Sihanouk's reception speech routinely praised Cambodian-Vietnamese solidarity and North Vietnam's contribution to the "liberation struggles" in South Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos. He also cryptically alluded to future DRV contributions to rebuilding not only South Vietnam but "the remaining part of Indochina." Evaluating the current situation in Cambodia, Sihanouk favorably noted speculation in Phnom Penh that the city would fall to the communists "in a year at the latest." But in his own personal forecast he was less definite, proclaiming the "certainty" of "the final victory of our two peoples and the total liberation of the rest of our Indochina in the near future."

NORTH VIETNAMESE LEADERS MAKE ANNUAL TET VISITS

Hanoi observed the Tet lunar new year holiday in traditional fashion this year, with a Vietnam Fatherland Front (VFF) meeting held on 9 February and annual pilgrimages by the top DRV leaders among the masses in Hanoi and to the provinces. All the currently active members of the Vietnam Workers Party (VWP) Politburo participated in the activities except Minister of Public Security Tran Quoc Hoan, who has only rarely put in public appearances during past Tet celebrations. Hoan was reported present as recently as 3 February at festivities marking the 45th anniversary of the VWP. The VFF meeting, attended by President Ton Duc Thang and National Assembly Standing Committee Chairman Truong Chinh and Vice Chairman Hoang Van Hoan, appears to have been the usual low-keyed affair, where participants merely exchanged remarks over toasts.

As in the past, First Secretary Le Duan and Truong Chinh received the lion's share of the publicity. Both were reported to have made excursions to meet individually with residents in and around Hanoi and in the countryside as well. Coverage of Le Duan's visits included the same attention to personal detail that has characterized accounts of his Tet visits in previous years; but, unlike last year, and some other years, the media were not noted to refer to him with

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such titles of respect as "venerated" or "beloved uncle."* Le Duan was reported to have gone to a farm cooperative in Ha Tay outside of Hanoi, to Hai Hung, and to Haiphong, and Truong Chinh to the "outskirts" of Hanoi and to Vinh Phu, where he met with "1941-1942 revolutionary comrades." Foreign Minister Nguyen Duy Trinh was also reported in Vinh Phu, but not at the same time as Truong Chinh.

Premier Pham Van Dong's holiday schedule was mainly devoted to hosting Sihanouk on his annual Tet visit to the DRV, although the Premier was briefly reported to have taken time out to make a new year's visit to a textile mill kindergarten in Hanoi. Defense Minister Vo Nguyen Giap resumed his traditionally prominent role in the activities this year with visits to a number of military establishments in Hanoi and Haiphong. His failure to appear last year during Tet coincided with a seven-month absence from public view that was not broken until his reappearance during the 1974 May Day celebration. Vice Premier Le Thanh Nghi inspected enterprises in the Viet Bac Autonomous Region, while Chief of the General Staff Van Tien Dung was only reported visiting military units at unspecified locations.

Politburo member Le Duc Tho and party Secretary Le Van Luong followed in the footsteps of Truong Chinh's 1974 foray into the southern panhandle area of Quang Binh and Vinh Linh and also traveled to the Ho Chi Minh trail to greet troops there. Belated Hanoi radio reports on 19 February stated that the two leaders not only had visited villages and cooperatives in Quang Binh and Vinh Linh but also had "spent Tet with the stalwart, brave combatants of the Truong Son unit, who live and fight along the historic communications line bearing the name of great uncle Ho." The report on Truong Chinh's trip to the panhandle last year had recounted that he had "enjoyed Tet with the armymen of the Truong Son mountain range," and a report on Le Duan's 1973 Tet activities told of his being welcomed during the holidays by "combatants" who had fought to open roads in the "Truong Son mountains."

* For a discussion of last year's Tet activities, see the TRENDS of 6 February 1974, pages 6-7.

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E C U A D O R

HAVANA PRAISES, MOSCOW IGNORES SEIZURE OF U.S. TUNA BOATS

Ecuador's seizure during late January and early February of seven U.S. fishing vessels reportedly operating some 40-130 miles off the Ecuadorean coast has been viewed by Havana as a blow against "U.S. imperialists who have been true pirates throughout their entire history."* Havana, as well as Moscow, in recent months has commented favorably on other moves by Quito, such as its strong criticism of the U.S. Trade Reform Act, its OPEC participation, and efforts by President Guillermo Rodriguez's military government to lift OAS sanctions against Cuba.

In Havana's only available reaction to the tuna boat seizure, an "Our America" program commentary on 3 February noted Ecuador's "profound indignation" at U.S. attempts to violate waters which Ecuadoreans "consider to be under their jurisdiction," and added that North American congressmen who "represent the interests of the Yankee fishing monopoly" were considering retaliation. Using the Ecuadorean case as a springboard to discuss the larger issue of "imperialism," the commentator asserted that the United States had been guilty of hundreds of cases of "piratical actions" and that not only fishing boats but also U.S. warships had invaded Latin America "in the most brazen fashion." Claiming that "U.S. imperialists" had been "true pirates throughout their entire history," the commentator praised the "renewed vigor" with which Latins were defending their sovereignty.

MOSCOW, HAVANA ON LAW OF SEA	Moscow's apparent silence on the Ecuadorean fishing boat action is consistent with the stated Soviet opposition to Ecuador's claim of "full sovereignty" within 200 miles of its coast in determining fishing and other activities and with its sensitivity regarding an issue vital to its own extensive deepsea fishing industry.
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Moscow and Havana appear to have adopted somewhat different positions on the issue of offshore fishing zones from that of Ecuador, as reflected in the summer 1974 third UN Conference on the Law of the Sea (LOS) at Caracas. Ecuador's position, reiterated at Caracas

* Havana's past support for Ecuador's offshore fishing policies, and the Cuba regime's initial reaction to the coup which brought Ecuador's military government to power in February 1972 are discussed in the TRENDS of 24 February 1972, pages 44-45.

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and supported by many third world countries, is that Quito has "full sovereignty"--both economic and territorial--within 200 miles of its coasts. Moscow's position at the Caracas LOS conference was to support a 12-mile territorial limit but to accept the concept of a loosely defined 200-mile economic zone within which, as Moscow radio noted on 26 August 1974, foreign states should be allowed to fish "for a reasonable price." The issue has been argued from time to time as part of the Moscow-Peking polemical exchange, since China has backed the concept of a 200-mile "territorial sea." For example, on 20 June 1974 NCNA had noted that each nation had the right to "determine the limits of its own territorial waters." Soviet criticism of the extended "territorial sea" concept has centered on denunciations of Peking, while avoiding mention of Ecuador, Peru and other countries holding views similar to China's. The Soviet journal NEW TIMES on 24 May had asserted that China's "obviously demagogic" proposals ran counter to the interests of "the overwhelming majority of states." In the same vein, the paper SOVIET KIRGIZIYA on 3 October declared that allowing each nation to set its own arbitrary limits would lead to "tyranny" and "chaos" in which "Peking's hegemonist plans" would prosper.

Havana's LOS position has generally fallen between that of the Soviet Union and the position maintained by Ecuador and others. On 4 July Cuba's LOS delegate announced that his country would support Peru and Ecuador in defense of the 200-mile territorial limit "as a principle of solidarity with the Latin American nations," but at the same time the delegate urged each coastal state to permit other nations "the right to fish in its regional waters." Along the same lines GRANMA WEEKLY REVIEW on 25 August renewed Cuba's support for the 200-mile territorial sea but noted that "most of the states" had agreed to a 12-mile territorial limit and a 200-mile economic zone.

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NOTES

KOREAN SHIP INCIDENT: North Korea has admitted that a DPRK vessel sunk by the ROK on 15 February had been south of the military demarcation line (MDL), but a KCNA "authorized statement" on 16 February accused the South of a "savage act of piracy" for sinking the ship rather than rescuing it. The statement claimed that the ship belonged to the Chongjin Traffic Control Corps and had been on routine patrol when it went "adrift" on the MDL after "losing its bearings because of inclement weather." A 17 February message from the North's vice chairman of the North-South Coordination Committee (NSCC) admitted the ship had "slightly" crossed the MDL. The KCNA statement accused the South of trying to "aggravate tension" between North and South to divert attention from the "political crisis" in the South following the "referendum farce," a reference to the recent vote in the South on ROK President Pak Chong-hui's policies. The statement demanded that the South "immediately" return the ship's "kidnapped crewmen"; Seoul has announced it holds a single survivor. In the NSCC message the North called on the South to "punish" those involved in the incident and "formally apologize." It also warned that similar such incidents "could lead to an unexpected grave situation."

MOSCOW ON ANGOLA: Soviet broadcasts to Africa have ceased their bitter criticism of Angolan liberation groups that had been competing with the Soviet-backed Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA), following the 5 January Mombasa agreement reconciling differences among three rival guerrilla organizations. The main thrust of Soviet comment on Angola during the summer and fall of 1974 had been to discredit the National Front for the Liberation of Angola (FNLA) and the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) and advocate popular support for the MPLA. Moscow radio commentaries had condemned the FNLA as a regional tribal organization based outside Angola which received CIA funds and fostered racial animosities. Harsh Soviet attacks had been directed at UNITA and its leader Jonas Savimbi, who was branded as an opportunist, a Maoist, and a traitor in the pay of the Portuguese secret police. By contrast, the MPLA was singled out as a "genuinely representative national organization" and the "leading force" in the national liberation struggle. After reporting the agreement among the three organizations in the first week of January, Moscow ceased discussing the FNLA and UNITA but continued to praise the role of the MPLA and to cite MPLA leader Agostinho Neto's warnings that "reactionary" forces and the CIA were attempting to halt the process of decolonialization.

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A P P E N D I X

MOSCOW, PEKING BROADCAST STATISTICS 10 - 16 FEBRUARY 1975

<u>Moscow (2443 items)</u>		<u>Peking (793 items)</u>	
Upcoming V-E Day 30th Anniversary	(--) 10%	World Table Tennis Games, Calcutta	(1%) 8%
British Prime Minister Wilson in USSR	(--) 8%	Developing Countries Raw Materials	(4%) 6%
[Brezhnev Speech	(--) 4%]	Conference, Dakar	
Salyut 4/Soyuz 17 Flight	(--) 4%	Japan	(1%) 3%
China	(6%) 4%	Schlesinger Report to Congress on U.S.	(--) 3%
Supreme Soviet Ratifica- tion of International BW/CW Ban	(--) 4%	Defense Posture Indochina	(11%) 2%

These statistics are based on the voicecast commentary output of the Moscow and Peking domestic and international radio services. The term "commentary" is used to denote the lengthy item—radio talk, speech, press article or editorial, government or party statement, or diplomatic note. Items of extensive reportage are counted as commentaries.

Figures in parentheses indicate volume of comment during the preceding week.

Topics and events given major attention in terms of volume are not always discussed in the body of the Trends. Some may have been covered in prior issues; in other cases the propaganda content may be routine or of minor significance.